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Explaining the G7 and G10’s influence on World Bank decisions  
The role of formal and informal rules of governance 
 
Abstract: This paper contributes to the literature examining the role played by donors’ interests within 
International Financial Institutions by showing how the G7 and G10 countries manage to influence World Bank 
(WB) decisions to satisfy their interests. It demonstrates that the G7 and G10 meets the two conditions required 
to influence WB decisions: they form a unified group (1) possessing sufficient power (2). The main thrust of the 
argument is that the G7 and G10 provide opportunity for big countries to come together and unify their 
preferences regarding WB decisions. Referring to a new dataset I find conjunctions between the G7’s 
declarations and the WB’s decisions, primarily reflecting the G7’s unity and influence over the WB. Then, 
relying on interviews with WB officials and an examination of WB formal and informal rules of governance, I 
show how G7 instructions provided outside the WB through declarations are relayed within to impact decisions.  
 
Key words: World Bank, governance, informality, G10, power, influence 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to explain how G7 and G10 countries influence the decision-making process of 
decision making within the World Bank (WB). A well established literature shows that the WB and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
1
 decisions reflect the interests of the main donors of these 
institutions (see for instance: Kilby, 2009; 2010; Foch, 2012). Stiglitz (2002, p. 52) argues that: “The 
decisions of every institution naturally mirror the opinions and interests of the decision-makers.” As a 
result, policies of international economic institutions are often in line with the financial and trade 
interests of industrialized and developed countries.  
 
While this literature suggests that donors influence IFI’s decisions in order to favour their interests, it 
does not show how donors manage to influence decisions. As stressed by Kilby (2010), the pathways 
through which donors exert influence in IFIs are not well studied. Dreher et al. (2009) suggest two 
routes in the case of the WB: formal influence through official decisions made by the executive board 
of directors and informal influence on decisions made by the staff in charge of projects. However, for 
both of these routes, the mechanisms through which donors exert influence in IFIs remain unknown. 
Secondly, we do not exactly know if the influence exerted is that of the US, the G7 or the G10. While 
there is evidence that developing countries aligning their UN votes on those of the US have better 
access to WB and IMF’s resources2, US voting within the UN may actually proxy for broader alliances 
or simply a commonality of interests (Stone, 2004). In this sense, Dreher and Sturm (2006) show that 
the UN voting patterns of all G7 and G10 countries are frequently correlated and aligned. Thus, the 
US influence highlighted by some studies may in fact reflect the combined influence of the G7 or the 
G10.  Thirdly, the literature only shows that WB (and IMF) decisions reflect the potential influence of 
donors without providing factual evidence as to donors effectively exerting an influence over IFIs 
through instructions directed toward these institutions.     
 
                                                     
1 Further on in this paper, the term International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is used to refer to these two institutions.  
2 See Barro and Lee (2005), Dreher and Jensen (2007) and Kilby (2009).  
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To address these gaps requires to analyze both the WB decisions and its system of governance. As in 
every banking institution, the WB’s voting system provides each shareholder with a voting weight (i.e. 
a number of votes) proportional to its capital subscription. As a result, some member States are more 
powerful than others. Although the US are the main shareholder they cannot steer the WB anymore 
and make the decisions on their own, as they did until the mid 1960s (Swedberg, 1986, p.381). Since 
then, the US hegemony within the WB (and the IMF) has been replaced by a US-Europe-Japan 
coalition (Bergsten and Henning, 1996). This implies that nowadays WB and IMF decisions are 
reached through negotiations with these Western powers that necessarily have to negotiate in order to 
reach an agreement. Whatever the attempts of single members to influence the decision-making 
process, the decisions taken by the WB are necessarily the result of agreements reached through 
negotiations and coordination. Thus, the US influence over WB decisions (see Fleck and Kilby, 
2006),
3
 is necessarily the effect of US’ lobbying efforts on other donors that have accepted to support 
the US (Kilby, 2010).  
 
Based on this reality and the literature showing the G7 and G10 countries’ influence over the WB, the 
main question of this article is the following: how can a group of countries with heterogeneous 
preferences manage to influence WB decisions? It is well established that any group of countries needs 
to meet two conditions in order to exert a decisive influence on international organizations: group 
unity and the possession of sufficient power (Woods and Lombardi, 2006; Gstöhl, 2007). Two 
dimensions must be addressed. The first deals with the modalities used by G7 and G10 countries to 
settle and share common positions despite their possible divergences and the heterogeneity of their 
preferences. The second dimension concerns the means used by these countries so as to gather the 
power required to further their common positions, and as such exert their influence.  
 
This article claims that the G7 – but more particularly the G10 – meets the two required conditions to 
the exercise of an influence on WB decisions. To support its view, this paper first shows that the G7 
and G10 countries share common political and economic features and use the informal political organs 
                                                     
3 See Gwin (1997) and Woods (2003) for a discussion about the US domination within the IFIs. 
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that the G7 and G10 represent, and the means associated to them, in order to consult and build their 
unity within the WB. These political organs offer various advantages: they are small, they are not 
filled with developing countries, they are flexible and formal rules are few, which makes them 
“mysterious” and little known to the public (Swedberg, 1986, p. 361). Using a new dataset that has not 
been looked at by the literature, and analyzing the G7’s declarations, I show the existence of 
instructions provided – from the outside – by the G7 to the WB (Figure 1), and their influence on WB 
decisions. Secondly, I examine how a G7 declaration becomes a WB decision. Based on interviews 
with WB officials as well as on an examination of formal and informal rules of the WB governance 
system, it appears that the G10 is the only coalition able to command sufficient power to influence 
WB decisions. Moreover, informal practices of governance within the WB have much to do with the 
G10’s formal and informal influence (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Channels of the G7 and G10’s influence over the WB 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
For the purpose of this paper, governance is defined as: “the structured ways and means in which the 
divergent preferences of interdependent actors are translated into policy choices, so that the plurality 
of interests is transformed into coordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved” (Eising 
and Kohler-Koch, 1999, p.5; Gstöhl, 2007, p.3). Moreover, in line with Cox and Jacobson (1973, p. 4), 
Woods (2003, p.4), and Gstöhl (2007, p.8) we distinguish the term of power from that of influence.  
While the former refers to the capability, that is, the aggregate of resources available to an actor, the 
latter constitutes the manifestation and exercise of power. We refer to Dreher et al (2009) for the 
distinction between formal and informal influence within the WB. Finally, our attention focuses on the 
G7/G10 WB 
Board’s decisions 
(Official votes) Formal  
instructions  
Staff’s decisions  
(project-level)  
Formal 
influence  
Informal influence 
Outside  Inside  
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.35
5 
 
G7 as much as on the G10, but more specifically on the latter. The G10 is an extension of the G7
4
 and 
is also an informal group, though a very organized and institutionalized one, bringing together the 
richest western countries. In addition, and as outlined by Swedberg (1986, pp. 381-382), the G10 
maintains particularly strong historical relations with the IFIs. Created in 1961 (as opposed to 1973 for 
the G5 that then became the G8 – Gstöhl, 2007, p. 3), it serves as a meeting organ – like the Paris Club 
or the Bank for International Settlements – in which negotiations related to the decisions that are to be 
made at the WB and the IMF happen.
5
 Compared to the G7, the G10 is more powerful. Indeed, it has a 
larger number of members represented at the executive board and this provides the group with a higher 
voting power, sufficient to impose its views.    
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the influence of donor’s 
interests on WB and IMF decisions. Section 3 and 4 demonstrate how donors manage to influence 
decisions. Section 3 shows that the political organs of the G7 and G10 allow big countries to come 
together and unify their preferences regarding WB activities. Section 4 shows that the rules of 
governance within the WB provide the G10 with sufficient power to influence – formally and 
informally – WB decisions. Section 5 concludes.   
2. Donors’ influence on the WB and the IMF: a review of the literature 
While the WB and IMF Articles of Agreement lay down a political and economic neutrality (IBRD, 
Article IV, section 10), there is a large literature on the influence of donors’ political and economic 
interests on decisions relating to the allocation of funding and the number of conditions attached to 
these funds.  
 
Regarding the allocation of funding, Thackler (1999), Bird and Rowlands (2001), and Barro and Lee 
(2005) show that the probability for a developing country to obtain an IMF loan increases significantly 
when its vote at the United-Nations (UN) general assembly reflects those of the US or European 
                                                     
4 In this paper, the terms G7 and G8 (and even G7/G8) are used. The G7 includes Germany, Canada, the US, France, Italy, 
Japan and the United-Kingdom, and becomes the G8 when Russia is included. See Gstöhl (2007, pp. 1 and 4) for a discussion 
on the historical composition of these groups. The G10 is the sum of the G7 countries and Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and 
Switzerland.   
5 Strange (1976, p. 112) shows that some decisions made by the IMF are, in fact, those of the G10. 
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countries. Andersen et al., (2005) and Kilby (2009) show that developing countries with votes aligned 
on the US’ one at the UN general assembly have a stronger probability of receiving loans from the 
WB. Harrigan et al., (2006), demonstrate that the probability for countries to receive a loan from the 
WB and the IMF is substantially determined by political factors that favor Western countries such as 
the implementation of pro-western foreign policies or the degree of political liberalization. Killick 
(1995) shows that one third of the 17 countries examined have received better terms of loans from the 
IMF thanks to the intervention of some of its major shareholders. Fleck and Kilby (2005) obtain a 
positive correlation between the share of US exports to a developing country and the share of WB 
loans attributed to this country. Oatley and Yackee (2004) obtain correlation showing that the IMF 
attributes bigger loans to developing countries who align their vote at the UN on the US’ one. Dreher 
and Jensen (2007) have focused on the influence of donors on the number of conditions attached to 
IMF loans. They show that the developing countries that have the most often voted similarly to the US 
and the G7 at the UN’s general assembly received a lower number of IMF conditions. The literature 
therefore shows that the WB and the IMF provide their financial assistance in better terms to 
developing countries that are important political allies or trading partners with the US and other G7 
countries. In this perspective, the financings attributed and the conditions prescribed by the WB and 
the IMF are seen as means to reward or sanction developing countries for the political and economic 
relations they have with G7 countries.     
 
It has also been argued that conditions prescribed by the WB and the IMF constitute by themselves a 
means to promote the implementation of reforms that favor the WB’s main donors’ interests. 
Boockman and Dreher (2003) show the existence of a positive correlation between the number of WB 
programs negotiated with a developing country and the local level of economic freedom. Harrigan et 
al., (2006) further this analysis and state that WB and IMF lendings promote the implementation of 
economic liberalization in developing countries, and that this increases both the openness of their 
economies to the world economy, and the number of business opportunities offered to Western 
investors.  
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While there is no empirical evidence in the literature that economic reforms promoted by the WB and 
the IMF effectively benefit the interests of the main donors of these institutions, Foch (2012) attempts 
to fill this gap. He seeks to explain why the World Bank (WB) has prescribed infrastructure 
privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) more than anywhere else and why it has intensified its 
prescriptions in recent years despite empirical evidence showing that privatization yields its poorest 
effects in the least developed countries. Relying on an empirical analysis based on 270 infrastructure 
privatization cases in SSA between 1960 and 2009, Foch shows that foreign and G10 firms benefit 
more from infrastructure privatization when it is supported by the WB than when it is not. He also 
shows that the WB provides greater support to privatization in the infrastructure sectors (water and 
electricity rather than transport) that benefit the most to G10 firms. This study reveals that WB 
decisions on aid conditionality are made according to the business opportunities they provide to G10 
firms.  
 
Globally, the literature provides considerable evidence suggesting the influence of groups of powerful 
donors (either the G7 or the G10) in IFIs lending decisions. This influence is formal when it concerns 
commitments, since commitments reflect board loan approval decisions, and informal when it relates 
to disbursements, as decisions to disburse committed funds are officially the responsibility of 
operational staff (Kilby, 2010). Following this distinction, donors’ influence on the conditions 
attached to funds is either formal and/or informal since conditionality is both discussed by the Board at 
the commitment stage, and applied by the staff since disbursements depend on the compliance with 
conditions (see section 4).  
 
Whether formal or informal, the question of how groups of donors manage to influence IFIs decisions 
is much less examined by the literature. Woods and Lombardi (2006) and Gstöhl (2007), however, 
establish that exerting influence on IFIs decisions requires a coalition of donors to be: i) unified 
enough to share common positions, and ii) sufficiently powerful to push forward its positions. The 
unity of the coalition is essential since it constitutes the sine qua non condition for its power to be 
converted into influence. Indeed, the possession of institutional power is only a potential source of 
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influence that needs, in order to be effective, a political will and thus a consensus to use it (Ghstöl, 
2007, p. 7). This means that within the executive board, the G10 countries must agree and come 
together in order to hold the majority of votes (i.e. 50%) required to formally influence decisions. 
Similarly, since informal influence is exerted by transmitting donor’s preferences to the staff (Dreher 
et al., 2009), the G10 countries must agree and make arrangements beforehand so that every country’s 
interests are taken into consideration
6
. This analysis leads to the question, not addressed by the 
literature, of how the G7 and G10 countries manage to meet the two conditions required for their 
coalition to influence WB decisions. Given the importance of the ‘unity’ condition, I first examine 
how and through which mechanisms, the G7 and G10 countries manage to overcome their divergences 
and unify their preferences on WB activities.  
3. The G10’s unity within the World Bank 
3.1 Similar features lead to common goals and interests 
Both the G7 and the G10 regroup the most industrialized countries that have common political and 
economic features. Their political systems are democratic and their global economic indicators are 
fairly similar. They have comparable annual average rates of GDP, standards of living (as of 
GDP/capita), public debt and deficit levels, and shares of global imports and exports (see Jaffrelot, 
2011). Moreover, G10 countries are all market economies integrated into the world economy, opened 
to global trade and finance, and holding some of the most developed financial markets and 
multinational firms. As shown by Figure 2, homogeneity among the G10 countries is strong. 
According to Bird and Rowlands (2001), the homogeneity of the G10’s preferences is such that it 
allows them to dominate the IMF and the WB.   
 
Figure 2. Average values of G10 globalization indexes between 2000 and 2009 
                                                     
6 In this view, and in line with Kilby (2010), evidences of US influence over WB disbursements (Fleck and Kilby, 2006; 
Kilby, 2009) are the result of US’ lobbying and coordination efforts with other donors.  
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Source: Author’s calculations from KOF 2012 data 
 
The common features of the G10 countries explain that they share the same goals and interests on the 
international scene. This point is well established by the literature. Indeed several studies argue that 
powerful Western countries use the IMF and the WB to promote a liberal political and economic 
model apt to serve their interests through the promotion of specific reforms and activities. From the 
G8’s point of view of, its weight in the global economy entrusts it with the responsibility to govern 
globalization (Ghstöl, 2007, p.1). To carry out this aim, it must rely on international institutions in 
order to meet several goals (De Guttry, 1994, p. 73). While initially being of economic, monetary, and 
financial nature, the range of these goals has broadened to now encompass new issues such as 
development, environment, foreign policy, and security (Putnam and Bayne 1987; Bayne, 2000; 
Siedersleben and Pabel, 2003; Ghstöl, 2007). Putman and Bayne (1987, pp. 158-160 and 160-166) 
show that G8 summits notably influence the activities and reforms promoted by the WB and the IMF. 
And, De Guttry (1994, p.74) states that the G7 aims at turning the most important WB, IMF, and 
OECD decisions in its favour. Bailin (2001) argues that the G8 interest since the late 1970s is to 
maintain an economic liberal order, and Bayne (2000, pp. 137-141) asserts that since the late 1990s, 
the G8 states have increasingly made use of global institutions. Swedberg (1986, pp. 388-389) 
explains the utility that powerful countries derive from their influence on IFI’s policies. He argues that 
the “doctrine of economic and political neutrality”, which prevails at the WB and the IMF, aims at 
keeping under wraps the intervention of the “most powerful Western countries” in favour of the 
introduction of “free-trade capitalism” in the domestic affairs of developing countries.  
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3.2 The use of informal mechanisms for coordination  
Although the G7 and G10 countries share common goals and interests within the IMF and the WB, it 
does not prevent them from having heterogeneous preferences and defending different positions. 
According to Bergsten and Henning (1996, pp.55-75) and Simiand (2010, p.348) the G7 is 
characterized by differences among members, especially on economic policies
7
. These divergences 
have often emerged within the IFIs and concerned the aid provided to developing countries
8
. Eldar 
(2004) also offers several empirical illustrations of political divergences within the UN Security 
Council
9
. However, an informal “non aggression pact” leads the G7 countries to avoid criticizing each 
other’s policies (Bergsten and Henning, 1996, p.4). In practice, the G8 does not act against its own 
collective interests nor against the vital interests of any of its members (Gstöhl, 2003). But, as argued 
by WB officials, G10 coordination is sometimes the result of a degree of coercion by the US. This 
means that other countries agree to go along with policies they do not like, because they calculate that 
this preserves a relationship that brings other benefits.  
 
Coordination between members is a necessary condition for the G7 and G10 to exert influence on IFIs 
decisions. Otherwise, differences of view might prevent the sharing of common positions, which is a 
prerequisite for influencing decisions. To go beyond their differences and unify their preferences, 
countries must necessarily pursue coordination efforts. To this aim, the G7/G8 and G10 countries use 
the informal political organs that the G7 and G10 represent, and the means associated to them. Though 
being informal groups, the G7/G8 and G10 are characterized by highly institutionalized processes of 
discussion, negotiation and coordination. Before the G7 and G10 official summits – which precede the 
WB and IMF spring and fall meetings –, important discussion and coordination efforts are made, 
implying the use of important means. Those efforts constitute informal mechanisms of governance 
produced by member States to reach agreements on the instructions to be transmitted to the WB and 
the IMF in order to influence their activities.  
 
                                                     
7 The priorities to be accorded to growth versus price stability, the responsibilities of surplus versus deficit countries.   
8 For instance, Germany abstained on the initial IMF vote to support the American effort in Mexico in 1994.   
9 Divergences of opinion between France and US about the second gulf war; refusal from the UN Security Council to accept 
Japan and Germany as permanent members.  
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Coordination and cooperation efforts are initially made outside the WB and the IMF. Schmunk (2000, 
p. 63) stresses that informal meetings are held all year long between ministries, officials and experts 
from the G8 countries thus creating a large network characterized by strong proximity and trust. 
Woods and Lombardi (2006, p. 15), and Gstöhl (2007, p. 4) show the existence of a tight informal 
cooperation between Finance Ministers and Central Bankers’ deputies who coordinate on the G7 
positions related to the IMF’s financial and monetary policies. And, Bini Smaghi (2004) reveals that 
those ministers and deputies are regularly informed by senior IMF officials through conference calls.  
Once agreements are reached by the G7, they feed the activities of their respective Executive Directors 
(EDs) who then coordinate among themselves and harmonize their positions on a vast number of 
issues ranging from international development architecture matters to more specific questions and 
local cases (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, p. 15). An important part is played by the ED in charge of 
the G7 presidency who has to organize informal meetings with the other EDs within the IMF and the 
WB, and circulate the discussion notes that serve as a base for negotiations and establishing common 
positions. When deemed necessary, the position that has been devised is forwarded to the Managing 
Director of the IMF and the President of the WB. These numerous informal meetings and 
consultations also take place in the context of the G10.
10
 Coordination efforts provided by the G7 and 
G10 countries within the WB and the IMF require important staff and means: 30 officials are sent to 
the IMF by the US to help its representative, 40 in the case of the North-Baltic States, and much more 
by European members (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, p.15).  
3.3 Evidence of the G7/G10’s unity and its influence on WB decisions 
According to Gstöhl (2007), since the G7/G8 decisions are only reached through consensus, each of 
the official G7/G8 declarations can be interpreted as an agreement reached between its members. 
Thus, G7/G8 declarations constitute, per se, pieces of evidence as to the unity of these groups,
11
 
revealing the success of the coordination efforts provided before official summits.  
 
                                                     
10 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7022 
11 See Dreher and Sturm (2006) for further evidence of the unity of the G7 and G10 within the UN.  
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The analysis of G7/8 declarations provides empirical evidence that countries share common positions 
regarding the IFIs. As underlined by the G8 Research Group, the “we” used in the official declarations 
refers to agreements not only among G8 members but also between them and the IFIs, to which they 
provide instructions (Simiand, 2010, pp. 62-63). In light of this, Gstöhl (2007) lists several G7 
declarations containing instructions to the IFIs regarding the case of highly indebted poor countries, 
and analyses the incidence of these G7 declarations (and their “strength”12) on WB, IMF and Paris 
Club decisions. This analysis covers the period 1982-2002 and results show a systematic conjunction 
between G7 declarations and decisions made by the WB, the IMF and the Paris Club following each 
annual summit (Appendix 1).  For instance, after the Lyon summit in 1996 where the G7 “urged” the 
Bretton Woods institutions to implement the Highly Indebted Countries Initiative (G7, 1996, para. 50), 
the WB and the IMF launched the Initiative a few months later, and the Paris Club approved it. Hence, 
this underlines the effective alignment of some WB decisions on those of the G7, and consequently the 
effective G7 influence on the WB.   
 
In line with Gstöhl, (2007) and Foch (2012), I show the influence of the G7 declarations regarding the 
necessity to increase private capital flows in developing countries on the WB decisions related to the 
privatization of public enterprises. The test covers the period 1980-2000 and assimilates the increase 
of private funds to privatization policies as those policies embrace, by definition, a large set of actions 
implying the private sector in the management, financing and ownership of public enterprises (Foch, 
2012, p.3). And, due to the absence of G10 declarations, the test relies only on those of the G7. 
Nevertheless, as the G7 is an extension of the G10 it seems acceptable to suppose that the G7 
declarations also engage the G10 countries. The analysis of the content of the G7 declarations 
emphasizes the intensification of the G7’s concerns in regard to an increase of private funds in 
developing countries and to the role the IFIs must play on this issue. These concerns were first 
expressed in 1979 and 1981 (G7, 1979, para.8 and G7, 1981, para.15), and referred for the first time to 
the WB in 1982: “we are prepared to continue and develop practical cooperation with the developing 
                                                     
12 In the manner of Simiand (2010), Gstöhl (2007, p. 10) shows the strength of a G7 consensus (i.e. of its declaration) is 
determined by the rhetoric used. For instance, formulations such as “we call” or “we urge” used for the IFIs are much 
stronger than “we encourage” or “we invite“.  
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countries through innovations within the World Bank, (…), through the encouragement of private 
capital flows, including international arrangements to improve the conditions for private investment” 
(G7, 1982). Eleven years later, the G7 provided instructions to the WB and the IMF: “The multilateral 
development banks and the IMF should require investment liberalization in their programs in Central 
and Eastern Europe and developing countries. (G7, 1990, para. 31). In 1994, the G7 is much more 
directive in its instructions to the WB, announcing: “We call on the World Bank as well as the 
regional development banks to strengthen their efforts to reinforce private capital flows to the 
developing world” (G7, 1994, para. 2).  
 
In order to examine possible incidences of this intensification of the G7’s concerns and the associated 
instructions on WB decisions, I have analyzed the WB’s Adjustment Lending Conditionality and 
Implementation Database (WB, 2009) which makes an inventory of all the conditions attached to 
financings attributed in the context of its programs since 1980.  The G7’s instructions may have a 
direct impact on WB conditionality since political authorities of member States can directly or 
indirectly influence the determination of conditions. Indeed, according to Rigo Sureda (2003, p. 569) 
“conditions (are) negotiated outside the realm of the Board”. And, some of them are directly dictated 
by industrial countries (Rajan, 2010, p.13). Political authorities of member States do not intervene 
directly on the conditionality related to specific operations but decide the global orientation of the 
conditionality policy.
13
 In fact, conditions attached to specific WB operations are set by the staff, 
though they are then ratified by the EDs (see section 4).  
 
Strikingly, Figure 3 shows a strong conjunction between the G7 declarations and the WB’s 
privatization conditions over the period 1980-1999. ALCID data reveals the introduction of WB’s 
privatization conditions just after the G7 had encouraged the WB to do so. Later on, in accordance 
with the G7’s requests, the share of WB’s privatization conditions increased between 1990 and 1994 
from 9% to 12%. Finally, in 1994, while the G7 provided much stricter and more direct instructions to 
                                                     
13 This is usually done through the Development Committee, a ministerial-level forum of the WB and the IMF that meets 
twice a year. 
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the WB, the WB significantly increased its share of privatization conditions from 12% to 21%. As 
confirmed by a Z test, this trend is statistically significant since the difference in the number of 
conditions in the three different periods is always statistically significant at the 1% level (p-value < 
0.01).  
 
Figure 3. Share of WB’s privatization conditions among the total amount of conditions between 1980 
and 1999 (all developing countries included) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB (2009) 
 
The G7’s decisive influence on WB conditionality is further evidenced by the incidence of its 
declaration of 1996 on the evolution of WB infrastructure privatization conditions. At the Lyon 
summit in 1996, the G7 urge the WB (and other multilateral institutions) to deliver more aid in order 
to support the development of the private sector in infrastructure sectors (G7, 1996, para. 37). This 
implied an increase in the use of technical assistance to promote privatization policies. While all 
developing countries were concerned, the priority was explicitly given to SSA.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the G7’s instructions have again significantly impacted the evolution of WB 
conditionality. Not only the WB has increased the rhythm of its privatization prescriptions in 
infrastructure since the mid 1990s, but this increase has also been considerably higher in SSA than in 
other developing countries. Between the two periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 the share of WB 
infrastructure privatization conditions has increased from 13% to 24% in SSA while the progression 
was only about 3 percentage points in all other developing countries. Though the Z test confirms that 
the two positive trends are statistically significant, the significance is higher for SSA (1% level against 
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5% level). This result reflects the priority given by the G7 to this region. The share of infrastructure 
privatization conditions continued to increase in both categories of countries between 1995-1999 and 
2000-2004 but, this time, in the same proportion. And, the two trends were not statistically significant 
anymore. This shows that the G7’s instructions in 1996 have been a triggering factor in the 
modification of WB conditionality.  
 
Figure 4. Share of infrastructure privatization conditions among the total amount of privatization 
conditions in SSA and other developing countries between 1990 and 2004  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB (2009) 
 
One might argue that instead of being the result of the G7's influence, the WB decisions to introduce 
privatization and intensify its implementation in developing countries can be explained by the 
efficiency of this policy. However, it is well established that the WB move to privatization in the 
1980s constituted a “leap of faith” as the WB had no empirical evidence proving the effective success 
of this policy (Nellis, 2006, p.6). In fact, it is the pressures exercised by the Reagan and Thatcher 
governments that have led the WB to introduce privatization (Cling and Roubeau, 2010). The 
efficiency argument cannot explain the WB decision to accelerate the rhythm of its privatization 
prescriptions in the mid 1990s either. Indeed, in the 1980s, a growing amount of empirical evidence 
led WB economists to stress the mitigated effects of privatization in low income countries – 
particularly in the infrastructure sector –, and to underline the risks of this economic policy (Kikeri et 
al., 1992, pp. 29 and 42). There are also strong elements in the literature rejecting the hypothesis that 
the introduction and intensification of privatization reflected an interest on the part of developing 
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countries for this policy (Ramamurti, 1999; Hall et al., 2005). It consequently appears that the trends 
observed in the WB conditionality are really the consequence of the G7's influence.  
4. Formal and informal rules of governance within the WB and the G10’s institutional power  
How a G7 declaration becomes a WB decision? In other words, how are the G7’s instructions 
provided outside the WB relayed inside to finally impact decisions? Addressing this question requires 
to analyze the second necessary condition for the G7 and G10 to exert influence over the WB: the 
possession of an institutional power sufficient to push forward their common positions. In line, with 
Gstöhl (2007, p. 9), institutional power refers to the voting weight (the number of votes held by one 
State member compared to the total number of votes). The power held by every WB member derives 
from the system of governance i.e. from the rules of representation and participation within the WB. 
While the WB status establishes such formal rules (i.e. written), they are in practice often 
complemented or replaced by informal rules (i.e. not written anywhere). I now examine to which 
extent the G7 and G10 representatives at the WB benefit from these two types of rules, and whether 
they hold sufficient power to implement the instructions sent to them.  
 
To this aim, I focus on the Executive Board (EB) and the current decisions it has to make. The EB is 
the main decisional instance within the WB (Woods, 2000). Not only does it decide on the attribution 
of financing projects, it also determines the policies which will guide the WB’s operations, and is 
accounts to the Governors annually, and interprets the WB articles of agreement.
14
 This accumulation 
of functions leads Strange (1974) to consider the “powerful” EB as the key to political influence on 
WB and IMF “neutral” decisions.  
4.1 World Bank formal rules of governance 
In 2011, the WB is governed by a 25-member EB (plus the President) which represents 184 member 
States. The Statutes of the WB provide very few formal rules regarding the representation of member 
States within the EB and the functioning of this board. It is only stated that the five main member 
States and shareholders (the US, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom) choose their own 
                                                     
14 See: http://go.worldbank.org/RRBDU3PQQ0      
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.35
17 
 
ED while other member States must regroup in circumscriptions (later on, the term “groups” is used 
intercheanbly), each containing an ED elected by one or several member States.
15
 Groups have no 
formal existence, and the WB is not concerned by their functioning (Leech and Leech, 2003). Indeed, 
WB (and IMF) Statutes provide no formal rules concerning the modalities by which member states 
can regroup in circumscriptions (Rigo Sureda, 2003; Woods and Lombardi, 2006). Statutes however 
establish formal rules in regard to the election of the EDs: within a group, the candidate receiving the 
largest number of votes is elected for two years. It is also established that elected EDs hold the total 
voting weight of the group they represent. As a result, important rivalries exist between member States 
for the ED position (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, p. 4). All the more so as there is no formal 
mechanism forcing or providing incentives to the elected EDs to account to their groups or even to the 
institution they work for (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, p. 6).      
 
Regarding the participation of EDs within the EB, WB Statutes stipulate current decisions have to be 
reached through a majority of votes (i.e. 50%).
16
 Though the G7 is well represented on the EB, with 
seven EDs, its collective voting power (45%) is therefore not sufficient to impose its views when a 
vote is held (Table 1). This means that the G7 is not powerful enough to make decisions on its own, 
and that it has to establish alliances with other countries. In this regard, other G10 countries (Belgium, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) are the most likely allies. These countries are known to 
represent additional votes gravitating around the very powerful G7’s bloc (Woods and Lombardi, 
2006, p.16). These additional votes are decisive because when added to those of the G7 countries, they 
constitute the majority required for making decisions: all together, the G10 countries hold more than 
56% of votes (Table 1). In this light, evidence of the G7’s influence on WB decisions should in fact be 
attributed to the G10 since it is the only group holding enough power to impose its views within the 
EB. In line with this analysis, I argue that a G7 declaration becomes a WB decision when the G7 and 
G10 countries vote as a group within the EB.  
 
                                                     
15 China, Russia and Saudi Arabia constitute a group on their own, and thus chose their ED.  
16 IBRD Statutes, Article V, section 3. 
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Table 1. The G7 and G10 collective voting weights within the Executive Boards of the IBRD and IDA 
in 2011  
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB data, 2012 
 
It is worth noting however that for the G10’s institutional power to be decisive, its members have to 
control the informal rules characterizing the WB daily governance.  
4.2 Informality as a central feature of the WB daily governance 
In reality, the formal rules of governance established by the WB Statutes are not totally respected and 
are often complemented or replaced by informal practices. I now examine what role these practices 
play in explaining the power held by the G10 and the influence it exerts on the decisions made by the 
Board (formal) and the Staff (informal).    
 
The informal functioning of circumscriptions. The G10’s institutional power has much to do with 
the fact that five of its members are directors of their groups, and thus with the informal rules 
governing the functioning of groups. Due to the absence of formal rules, countries are completely free 
to regroup in circumscriptions as the numerous movements observed testify.
17
 Two factors generally 
motivate those movements: firstly a better leading position within a group, secondly the possibility of 
sharing common features, especially geographical and cultural ones, with other members of the group. 
Countries pay great attention to their relative position within a group as it often determines their 
capacity to obtain the positions of ED, ED deputy, senior advisor or advisor.  
 
                                                     
17 For a detailed discussion of these movements, see Woods and Lombardi (2006, p. 4).  
 
IBRD IDA 
 Total of votes %   Total of votes %  
G7* : 754738 45.77 6878948 42.56 
G10** :  934350 56.67 10474500 56.25 
* Canada and Italy are directors of their groups which respectively have 13 and 17 members. Their respective voting weights are 3.77% and 
3.44% at the IBRD, and 4.39% and 3.34% at the IDA.                                                        
** In addition to Canada and Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland are directors of their groups which respectively have 13, 8 and 9 
members. Their respective voting weights are 4.44%, 3.28% and 3.18% at the IBRD, and 4.26%, 4. 97% and 4.46% at the IDA. 
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At the IMF, it has been established that the voting weight is the major determinant in the selection of 
EDs, and this choice is made long before the official vote happens (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, p.26). 
In practice, results derived from the election are determined ex ante within each group and the ED is 
nominated according to the specific conventions in place. Three types of groups exist and each of them 
is characterized by different informal conventions. On the one hand, there are groups that are 
dominated by a member whose voting weight is such that it is generally the ED. On the second hand, 
there are groups which are dominated by several members whose voting weights are far higher than 
other members and who thus share the direction of the group. Finally, there are groups with an equal 
repartition of voting weights, and in which the direction of the group is rotative among all members.  
 
My analysis of the composition of the WB circumscriptions in 2012 confirms that this typology also 
exists at the WB, and that the relative voting weights of members often determine the conventions 
related to the nomination of the EDs (Appendix 2). This informal governance system of 
circumscriptions within the EB is very beneficial to the elected EDs of the G10 countries. First, it 
allows most of these countries to be directors of their groups. As shown by Table 2, while six of the 20 
groups include one country coming from the G10, in 5 out of 6 cases this G10 country is dominating, 
and in 4 out of 6 cases it is the effective ED. Sweden is also the ED of its group although it holds 
nearly as much votes (0.92%) as Denmark (0.83%) or Norway (0.62%). In these types of cases (called 
“cartels” in Table 2) informal conventions in place impose a rotative direction between the most 
powerful members of the group. This convention is also that of the group directed by Austria but 
dominated by Belgium. 
 
Table 2. Features of groups including one country from the G10 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB data, 2012 
Total number of groups  20 
Number of groups with one G10’s member 6 
Number of groups dominated and directed by a G10’s member  5 
Number of groups dominated but not directed by a G10’s member 1 (Belgium) 
Number of groups ‘in cartel’ including one G10’s member who acts as the ED 1 (Sweden) 
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Secondly, the five G10 members that are directors of their group hold an aggregated collective voting 
weight of 18.05% instead of 10.16% by themselves, in 2012 (Table 3). This aspect is crucial since it 
sufficiently reinforces the voting weight held by the five main WB shareholders (36.47%) to enable 
the G10 to impose its views on issues where its members share a common position. Otherwise, the 
group would not have enough votes to hold the power to decide on the EB.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of the collective and individual voting weights of the G10’s EDs  
Source: Author’s calculations based on WB data, 2012 
 
Since the EDs have no obligation to give account to the members they represent, they are totally free 
to deal with the concerns and interests of their respective countries and of the coalitions of which these 
countries are a members (Woods and Lombardi, 2006, pp. 6-7). The G10 EDs are particularly known 
to focus on the business opportunities offered by the WB and IMF policies to the countries they 
represent
18
. Indeed, as revealed by interviews with WB officials, the voting weight of each country 
gives it a proportional access to the provision contracts generated yearly by WB projects. Due to the 
size of the market shares available to them, the G10 countries pay considerable attention to the 
enforcement of that informal rule, to the point of constituting the main objective of the EDs. Indeed, 
each year, the governors evaluate the work of their ED based on this objective. Obtaining a market 
share superior or equal to the quota of the country they represent is, for EDs, a means to secure their 
positions.  
 
                                                     
18 This aspect is well illustrated in Woods and Lombardi (2006, p. 14). 
G10 country being ED of their group Collective voting weight  Individual voting weight  
Canada 3.72% 2.73% 
Italy 3.45% 2.73% 
Sweden 3.27% 0.92% 
Switzerland 3.18% 1.62% 
Netherlands 4.43% 2.16% 
Total 18.05% 10.16% 
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This characteristic probably explains why the WB continues to support privatization policies despite 
their poor or even detrimental impacts in developing countries, and why the G7 asked the WB to 
introduce these policies in the early 1980s. As shown by Foch (2012), privatization policies create 
particularly important and attractive business opportunities that mostly benefit firms of the G7 and 
G10 countries.  
 
The informal rule of consensus in the decision-making process. Whereas the WB Statutes stipulate 
that decisions must be reached through the simple majority of votes, they are in practice informally 
made through consensus (Woods, 2000; Rigo Sureda (2003); Woods and Lombardi, 2006). However, 
the voting weights of members are taken into account by all participants at the meetings of the EB 
(Woods, 2000), and notably by the Secretary of the counsel who is in charge of determining the size of 
the consensus. The WB President, as the chairman of the EB, then determines the « sense of the 
meeting », i.e. the decision that results from it.  
 
The informal rule of consensus is in fact very beneficial to the G10 countries and especially to the five 
main WB shareholders. Indeed, the voting weights held by the EDs affect the negotiations and 
informal political propositions long before their discussion in front of the EB (Woods, 2000). As a 
result, when the five main WB shareholders share the same view on an issue, this view is generally 
adopted by the EB. As stressed by WB officials and Kapur (2002, p. 167), EDs with the weakest 
voting weights fear to oppose with the most powerful EDs as they risk to pay for that when a decision 
concerning their country appears on the EB’s agenda. In reality, disagreements rarely happen as EDs 
use informal arrangements before the official meetings of the EB in order to resolve any divergence of 
views. According to Rigo Sureda (2003, p. 574): “The informality is not limited to the manner in 
which final decisions are made but also in the series of informal meetings leading to the point where a 
consensus has matured.”  The five standing committees, and other ad hoc ones, through which the EB 
operates play a great role in the maturation process of the consensus. Operating on a consensual basis, 
they reach decisions which serve as advice to the EDs and prepare the agreements that could be 
reached by the EB. According to De Gregorio et al., (1999) and Woods (1999; 2000), consensus is 
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harmful not only to the transparency of the decision making process,
19
 but the experience at the UN 
also shows that a majority of decisions are made by the most powerful members.  
 
Informal practices regarding the conception and implementation of projects. Officially, decisions 
related to the conditionality of specific projects and to the disbursement of funds committed to these 
projects is the responsibility of the Staff. The EB’s role is limited to the approbation of new projects. 
In practice however, EDs can informally influence the WB projects’ cycle through occasional 
pressures indirectly exercised via the WB management (i.e. the Country Director, Sector Director and 
Vice President) on the staff.  
 
As noted by WB officials, the staff knows the existing majorities in place at the EB, and is aware of 
the EDs’ preferences. This provides the staff with the incentive to conceive loan projects that comply 
with the preferences of the EB main members. On this point, Rigo Sureda (2003, p. 580) notes: 
“Individual initiative on the part of staff members is both expected and rewarded.” Staff members 
may risk their reputation and career if their projects are refused by the EB. But, the EB generally 
approves the loan projects submitted by the staff. Not approving those projects could be seen as a vote 
of no confidence in the country seeking the loan and in staff and management’s handling of the loan 
program. 
 
Once projects are approved, the staff is officially in charge of suspending the implementation of 
projects depending on the compliance with conditionality. This does not mean that there might not be 
occasional interventions from the top down. According to Kapur (2002, pp. 91-94) the EB can 
informally influence staff decisions through pressure, exercised on the management, requiring to speed 
up or give priority to certain loans the EDs are particularly concerned about. And, when projects are 
suspended, the EB can decide whether they should be reinstated and can ask the inclusion or rejection 
of some clauses attached to the projects. Interestingly, in the case of the IMF, Stone (2004) finds that 
                                                     
19 Because decisions are made behind closed doors without a detailed record of votes being kept. “This means that parties not 
present at the discussion may never find out why or how a particular decision came to be made, nor can they hold any 
particular parties responsible or accountable for that decision”, Woods (2000). 
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reinstatements happen more expeditiously for geopolitically important countries. It is also well 
recognized that the WB almost never cancels its lending programs in developing countries even when 
governments have not enough respected the attached conditions (see for instance Ranis, 1996; Dollar 
and Svensson, 1998). This is evidence of the informal influence of the EB since the staff must 
automatically suspend projects when countries fail to meet lending conditions.   
 
The informal influence of the EDs on the WB’s project cycle is all the more easy to exercise as they 
directly intervene in the staff and management recruitment. While, as stipulated by the WB Statutes, 
the President is nominated by the EB, he is in reality directly nominated by the US due to an informal 
historical convention (Woods, 2003, p. 17). The President is officially in charge of the senior positions 
but he cannot make a decision without the US and EB’s approbation. The senior management is then 
in charge of the recruitment process regarding the WB staff but there is however a control of the 
President and the EB. As suggested by Woods (2000, pp. 16-17), there results from this recruitment 
process a kind of unique ideology characterizing the staff. Empirical studies have shown that despite 
the existence of quotas,
20
 geographical and institutional biases are prominent features of the WB (and 
IMF) staff composition. A WB study shows that 80% of the senior staff from the Research and 
External Affairs departments had, in 1991, a formation of Economics and Finance obtained in US and 
UK universities.  
5. Conclusion  
This paper contributes to the literature examining the role donors’ interests play in IFIs by showing 
how the G7 and G10 countries manage to influence WB decisions in order to satisfy their interests. 
Groups of countries need to meet two complementary conditions in order to exert a decisive influence 
on WB and IMF decisions: the unity of their group and the possession of sufficient power. The main 
thrust of the argument is that the G7 and G10 provide opportunity for big countries to come together 
and unify their preferences on development aid, providing an informal channel for these countries to 
impact the World Bank's decisions. Focusing on privatization-related issues and using the new ALCID 
                                                     
20 IBRD Statutes, Article V, section 5 d.  
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dataset, I find quantitatively and statistically significant conjunctions between G7’s declarations and 
WB decisions, primarily reflecting the G7’s unity and influence over the WB. Further on, I show how 
the G7’s instructions provided outside the WB through official declarations are relayed inside to 
finally impact decisions. Following an analysis of the voting weights held by the G7 and G10 
countries within the WB’s EB, and of the formal and informal rules of governance, I argue that the 
G10 is the only coalition able to possess a power sufficient to influence WB decisions. Since, the G7’s 
voting weight (i.e. power) is insufficient to reach the majority of votes officially required by the 
decision making process, it has to establish alliances with other G10 countries in order to reinforce its 
power so as to take decisions on its own. This finding means that evidence of the G7’s influence on 
WB decisions in the literature should actually be attributed to the G10.  
 
The G10 influence is largely due to the informal practices of governance that often complement or 
replace formal ones within the WB. The G10 countries benefit from the informal practices 
characterizing the functioning of circumscriptions since they allow five of them to be directly 
represented and to hold the collective voting weight of the countries they represent. Similarly, the 
informal rule of consensus means that transparency is low, and that when the five main WB 
shareholders share the same view on an issue, this is generally that of the EB. Finally, interviews with 
WB officials reveal that powerful countries informally exert pressures on the staff, though this is 
occasional, in order to influence decisions related to the disbursement of funds and the attached 
conditionality. And, since the EB can control the staff’s recruitment process, this informal influence is 
made easier to exert. Overall, these findings lead to the conclusion that informality is a source of the 
efficiency with which the G10 influences on WB decisions.  
 
Following this conclusion, and in accordance with Kilby (2010), I argue that reform efforts provided 
to improve the representation and participation of developing countries within the IFIs, and to reduce 
the control of the G7 over the decision making process
21
, should better take into consideration the 
importance of informal practices of governance. To date, efforts have only implied minor changes: the 
                                                     
21  See Lombardi (2008) for a discussion of these efforts. 
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creation of a 25
th
 seat at the EB attributed to South Africa (ED of another African circumscription) and 
the transfer of votes from some G10 countries to China, Brazil, and India (Le Figaro, 2010). Although 
these governance reforms have improved the representation of emerging countries within the WB, 
they have not implied, however, any change important enough to reduce the control of the G10 
countries on the WB. These countries (whose collective voting weight has only been reduced by 1.97 
points) still hold sufficient power to influence WB decisions. In line with Stiglitz (2003), I argue that 
this is notably due to the fact that the extent to which informality characterizes the daily management 
of the WB has not been reduced. For instance, the historical and informal convention characterizing 
the nomination of the WB’s President is still in place as with the recent appointment of M. Jim Yong 
Kim, an American citizen although the Nigerian candidate was said to be more competent by several 
well-known economists and observators.
22
 It seems that the vote of Russia, a G8 member, was 
decisive in that choice.
23
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Appendix 1. Conjunctions between the G7 instructions and WB, IMF, and Paris Club decisions 
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Source: Gstöhl, 2007, p.16, Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Composition of the WB circumscriptions in 2012 
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Member Number of Votes Percentage of Total Votes Nbre of members Total voting weight Type of group ED G10 ED deputy G10
Austria 11313 ,68%
Belarus 3573 ,22%
Belgium 29233 1,77%
Czech Republic 6558 ,4%
Hungary 8300 ,5%
Kosovo, Republic of 1216 ,07%
Luxembourg 1902 ,11%
Slovak Republic 3466 ,21%
Slovenia 1511 ,09%
Turkey 8578 ,52%
Armenia 1389 ,09%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 799 ,05%
Bulgaria 5465 ,33%
Croatia 2543 ,15%
Cyprus 1711 ,1%
Georgia 1834 ,11%
Israel 5000 ,3%
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of677 ,04%
Moldova 1618 ,1%
Montenegro 938 ,06%
Netherlands 35753 2,16%
Romania 4261 ,26%
Ukraine 11158 ,68%
Costa Rica 483 ,03%
El Salvador 391 ,02%
Guatemala 2251 ,14%
Honduras 891 ,05%
Mexico 19054 1,15%
Nicaragua 858 ,05%
Spain 28247 1,71%
Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de20611 1,25%
Antigua and Barbuda 770 ,05%
Bahamas, The 1321 ,08%
Barbados 1198 ,07%
Canada 45045 2,73%
Dominica 754 ,05%
Grenada 781 ,05%
Guyana 1308 ,08%
Ireland 5521 ,33%
Jamaica 2828 ,17%
St. Kitts and Nevis 525 ,03%
St. Lucia 802 ,05%
St. Vincent and the Grenadines528 ,03%
Brazil 33537 2,03%
Colombia 6602 ,4%
Dominican Republic 2342 ,14%
Ecuador 3021 ,18%
Haiti 1317 ,08%
Panama 635 ,04%
Philippines 7094 ,43%
Suriname 662 ,04%
Trinidad and Tobago 2914 ,18%
Albania 1080 ,07%
Greece 1934 ,12%
Italy 45045 2,73%
Malta 1324 ,08%
Portugal 5710 ,35%
San Marino 845 ,05%
Timor-Leste 767 ,05%
Australia 24714 1,5%
Cambodia 464 ,03%
Kiribati 715 ,04%
Korea, Republic of 16067 ,97%
Marshall Islands 719 ,04%
Micronesia, Federated States of729 ,04%
Mongolia 716 ,04%
New Zealand 7486 ,45%
Palau 266 ,02%
Papua New Guinea 1544 ,09%
Samoa 781 ,05%
Solomon Islands 763 ,05%
Tuvalu 461 ,03%
Vanuatu 836 ,05%
Bangladesh 5104 ,31%
Bhutan 729 ,04%
India 45045 2,73%
Sri Lanka 4067 ,25%
Denmark 13701 ,83%
Estonia 1173 ,07%
Finland 8810 ,53%
Iceland 1508 ,09%
Latvia 1634 ,1%
Lithuania 1757 ,11%
Norway 10232 ,62%
Sweden 15224 ,92%
Azerbaijan 1896 ,11%
Kazakhstan 3235 ,2%
Kyrgyz Republic 1357 ,08%
Poland 11158 ,68%
Serbia 3096 ,19%
Switzerland 26856 1,62%
Tajikistan 1310 ,08%
Turkmenistan 776 ,05%
Uzbekistan 2743 ,17%
Type of group is a 
"CARTEL" of two 
members.
YES NO
Dominated by 
Switzerland (1,62)
YES NO
YES NO
Dominated by 
Australia (1,5)
NO NO
Dominated by 
India (2,73)
NO NO
Dominated by 
Italy (2,73)
Dominated but 
non directed by 
BELGIUM. 
Directed by 
Austria (0,68). 
The ED deputy is 
Belgium. Type of 
group is a 
"CARTEL" of two 
members 
NO YES
Dominated by 
Netherlands (2,16)
YES NO
Type of group is a 
"CARTEL" of  3 
members
3,52%
3,45%
3,4%
3,33%
3,27%
3,18%
4,57%
4,43%
4,4%
3,72%
NO NO
Dominated by 
Canada (2,73)
YES NO
Dominated by 
Brazil (2,03)
NO NO
9
12
9
7
14
4
8
10
13
8
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Source: Author’s calculations based on WB, 2012 
Afghanistan 550 ,03%
Algeria 9502 ,57%
Ghana 1775 ,11%
Iran, Islamic Republic of 23936 1,45%
Morocco 5223 ,32%
Pakistan 9589 ,58%
Tunisia 969 ,06%
Bahrain 1353 ,08%
Egypt, Arab Republic of 7358 ,44%
Iraq 3058 ,18%
Jordan 1638 ,1%
Kuwait 13530 ,82%
Lebanon 590 ,04%
Libya 8090 ,49%
Maldives 719 ,04%
Oman 1811 ,11%
Qatar 1346 ,08%
Syrian Arab Republic 2452 ,15%
United Arab Emirates 2635 ,16%
Yemen, Republic of 2462 ,15%
China 45049 2,73% 1 2,73% NO NO
Saudi Arabia 45045 2,73% 1 2,73% NO NO
Russian Federation 45045 2,73% 1 2,73% NO NO
Brunei Darussalam 2623 ,16%
Fiji 1237 ,07%
Indonesia 15231 ,92%
Lao People's Democratic Republic428 ,03%
Malaysia 8494 ,51%
Myanmar 2734 ,17%
Nepal 1218 ,08%
Singapore 570 ,03%
Thailand 6599 ,4%
Tonga 744 ,04%
Vietnam 1218 ,07%
Argentina 18161 1,1%
Bolivia, Plurinational State of2035 ,12%
Chile 7181 ,43%
Paraguay 1479 ,09%
Peru 5581 ,34%
Uruguay 3062 ,19%
Angola 2926 ,18%
Nigeria 12905 ,78%
South Africa 13712 ,83%
Benin 1118 ,07%
Burkina Faso 1118 ,07%
Cameroon 1777 ,11%
Cape Verde 758 ,05%
Central African Republic 1112 ,07%
Chad 1112 ,07%
Comoros 532 ,03%
Congo, Democratic Republic of 2893 ,17%
Congo, Republic of 1177 ,07%
Cote d'Ivoire 2766 ,17%
Djibouti 809 ,05%
Equatorial Guinea 965 ,06%
Gabon 1237 ,07%
Guinea-Bissau 790 ,05%
Mali 1412 ,09%
Mauritania 1150 ,07%
Mauritius 1492 ,09%
Niger 1102 ,07%
Sao Tome and Principe 745 ,04%
Senegal 2322 ,14%
Togo 1355 ,08%
Botswana 865 ,05%
Burundi 966 ,06%
Eritrea 843 ,05%
Ethiopia 1228 ,07%
Gambia, The 793 ,05%
Kenya 2711 ,16%
Lesotho 913 ,05%
Liberia 713 ,04%
Malawi 1344 ,08%
Mozambique 1180 ,07%
Namibia 1773 ,11%
Rwanda 1296 ,08%
Seychelles 513 ,03%
Sierra Leone 968 ,06%
Sudan 1100 ,07%
Swaziland 690 ,04%
Tanzania 1545 ,09%
Uganda 867 ,05%
Zambia 3060 ,19%
Zimbabwe 3575 ,22%
Type of group is 
"BALANCED"
NO NO
Type of group is 
"BALANCED"
NO NO
Dominated by 
Argentina (1,1)
NO NO
Type of group is "CARTEL" of two membersNO NO
NO
Dominated by 
Kuwait (0,82)
NO NO
Dominated by 
Indonesia (0,92) 
(might be a 
"CARTEL" of 3 
members)
NO NO
1,62%
Dominated but not 
directed by Iran. 
The ED is 
Pakistan (0,58). 
The ED deputy is 
Algeria. Type of 
group is 
NO3,12%
2,84%
2,48%
2,27%
1,79%
1,69%21
20
7
13
11
6
3
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